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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
by contract. In accordance with this tendency is the case of Love v.
Nashville Agricultural and Normal Institution (1922) , 33 which holds
that a private charitable corporation cannot be exempted from liability
for injuries caused by a nuisance maintained by it on the theory that
its funds are held in trust for the purposes of its creation. So also,
in Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital (1922) 31 a charity
hospital was held liable for failure to exercise due care in the selection
of employees. In Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein
(1920) 3 5 the court holds that one entering a hospital has no thought
of assuming the risk of injury from negligence. In this case Hallam,
J., says, "This corporation must administer its functions through
agents, as any other corporation does. It harms and benefits third
parties as they are harmed or benefited by others. To the person
injured the loss is the same as though the injury had been sustained
in a private hospital for gain. In this case the deceased paid for the
services he expected would be rendered, but this may not be a con-
trolling fact. We do not believe that a policy of irresponsibility best
subserves the beneficent purposes for which the hospital is maintained.
WAre do not approve the public policy which would require the widow
and children of deceased, rather than the corporation, to suffer the loss
incurred through the fault of the corporation's employees, or, in other
words, which would compel the persons damaged to contribute the
amount of their loss to the purposes of even the most worthy corpora-
tion. We are of the opinion that public policy does not favor exemp-
tion from liability." WENDELL J. PHILLIPS, '27.
REFORMATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS
BECAUSE OF MISTAKES OF LAW
It has long been a general rule that Courts of Equity are power-
less to correct mistakes of law, and order the reformation of written
instruments executed while the parties labored under a mistaken idea
as to their legal rights or status.' But like many broad general princi-
ples this particular one has become the plaything of many Courts until
33. 146 Tenn. 550; 243 S. W. 304.
34. 104 Ohio St. 61; 135 N. R. 287.
35. 144 Minn. 392; 175 N. W. 699.
1. Norton v. Highleyman, 88 Mo. 621.
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now it is so warped by constant differentiations, exceptions, and direct
evasions that it has almost ceased to exist as a true rule of law.2
Probably no general principle has resulted in greater divergence
of judicial opinion and conflicting decisions 3 A great majority of the
States have had this question presented to their highest tribunals, and
the conclusions reached by these various Courts has thrown the law
on the subject into irreconcilable conflict and confusion. Not only is
the law confused among the various states, but within the same state
the Courts, in many instances, have reached directly contrary results;
although, in fairness to the attempted consistency of the various State
Courts, we can say that the cases within the same state usually enunci-
ate the general rule, and then by artistic distinctions and differentia-
tions proceed to reach results wholly unsustainable under the general
rule.
Some states have followed the general rule strictly.' On the other
hand, a few states seem prone to treat mistakes of law exactly the same
as they treat mistakes of fact and grant relief in all cases.' However.
it is safe to say that most states still follow the general rule unless
the Court can find in the case either (1) a mixed mistake of law and
fact, or (2) some special circumstance which, in the opinion of the
Court, justifies an exception to the general rule. It is this later group
of cases that has thrown the law of this subject into such confusion
and uncertainty thereby making it more and more difficult to tell in
a particular case just what "special circumstances" the Court will con-
sider sufficient to justify an exception to the general rule.
In enunciating the general rule, the Court in Heavenridge v.
MondyO said: "It is settled law, that to entitle a party to reformation of
a written instrument, it must be clearly and satisfactorily shown that
there was a mistake of fact, and not law."' This general rule has been
frequently enunciated by the Federal Courts" and the Supreme Court.9
The following States have also enunciated and applied the general
rule: Georgia,1 Illinois,1 Indiana,' 2 Kentucky,' 3 Michigan, 14 New
2. 34 Cyc. 911.
3. 34 Cyc. 911.
4. Atherton v. Roche, 192 I1. 282, 55 L. R. A. 591.
5. Bonbright v. Boubright, 123 low.t 305, 98 N. W. 784.
6. 49 Ind. 434.
7. Italics mine.
8. Hoover v. Reilly, Fed. Cases No. 6677.
9. Snell v. Atlantic F. & M. Ins. Co., 98 U. S. 85, 25 L. ed. 52.
10. 116 Ga. 915.
11. Atherton v. Roche, supra.
12, 22 Ind. App. 139, 53 N. E. 391; also 49 Ind. 434, supra.
13. 19 Kty. Law Rep. 1988, 44 S. W. 986 (Semble).
14. 18 Mich. 354, 100 Am. Dec. 181.
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Jersey,"5 New York,"0 North Carolina,17 Texas,' Utah,'0 Oklahoma, 20
Delaware, 2' Oregon 2' and Idaho.3
As has- already been pointed out, a few States have apparently
made no distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law,'
24
and have therefore granted relief in both cases. In the Iowa case of
Bonbright v. Bonbright 25 the Court said: "It is now well settled in this
State that a Court of Equity will reform a contract even where, through
mistake of law, it does not express the true intent of the parties."
Likewise it was held in West Virginia2 6 that "where there is a mutual
mistake between the parties to a written contract or deed, even though
such mistake be legal, a Court of Equity will grant relief." Similar
holding seems to prevail in Ohio.'
7
It seems to be well settled in most jurisdictions that where the
mistake involves a question of both law and fact, equity can step
in and reform the instrument; providing, of course, that the mistake
is mutual .' It seems also to be well settled that where the mistake
of law is made by a scrivener when reducing the agreement to writ-
ing, there is sufficient cause for equity to step in and grant a reforma-
tion of the instrument. 29 But it has also been held that equity will
never grant reformation when the mistake of law is due to the Court's
overruling a prior decision.' 0
Courts in order to stick to the general rule have held that "bare"
mistakes of law furnish no grounds for equitable relief.2 ' But some-
times the Courts after admitting the general rule simply refuse to
follow it and proceed to reform the instrument. However, when there
are "special circumstances" or equities affecting the case the Cotfrts
have little trouble in getting away from the general rule.
Examples of these "special circumstances" are numerous. If one
15. 50 Atl. (N. J.) 673 (Semble).
16. 19 App. Div. 552, 46 N. Y. S. 288.
17. 124 N. C. 622, 32 S. E. 917.
18. 27 Tex. Civ. App. 262, 66 S. W. 94.
19. 17 Utah 43, 53 Pac. 215.
20. 203 Pac. (Okla.) 217.
21. 117 At!. (Del. Ch.) 823.
22. 230 Pac. (Ore.) 812.
23. 240 Pac. (Idaho) 859.
24. Bonbright v. Bonbright, supra.
25. 123 Iowa 305, 98 N. W. 784.
26. Biggs v. Bailey, 49 W. Va. 188, 38 S. E. 499.
27. Evants v. Strode, 11 Ohio 480;
McNaughton v. Partridge, 11 Ohio 223.
28. Griffin v. Townley, 69 Mo. 13, 33 Am. Dec. 476.
29. Smith v. Owens, 63 W. Va. 60.
30. Keynon v. Welty, 20 Cal. Rep. 637;
Hardgree v. Mitchum, 51 Ala. 151.
31. Norton v. Highleyman, supra.
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party tries to take advantage of the other because of the mistake,
equity will almost always give relief on general equitable principles .
In Whitmore v. Hay33 it was held that a mistake of law caused by the
incorrect advice of a notary should be reformed in equity. Likewise
where mistakes of law have been induced by the acts of the other party
there is grounds for equitable relief by way of reformation.34 King v.
Doolittle35 goes further in holding that where parties in good faith
attempt to convey valid title to a piece of property, but because of a well
settled principle of law, of which both parties were ignorant, the title
would have failed, then equity will reform the deed so as to convey
perfect title. A great many states allow the reformation of an instru-
ment when, because of mistake of law, it fails to conform to the actual
bargain made.36 But as to this later proposition there is quite a line
of cases holding exactly contra.
37
The Courts in granting reformation in some of these "special
circumstance" cases have tried to make a distinction between so-called
private and public rights in holding that if the mistake of law had
to do with private rights then equity could grant relief, but if it was a
matter of public rights, then equity would not grant relief. But it is
difficult to understand how this private-public rights test could prove
either practicable or satisfactory, because in each case presented to the
Court it would resolve itself into a private rights case, and we would
find equity granting relief in practically all cases.
Tn reviewing the whole mass of judicial opinion upon this subject
the hopeless confusion of the law becomes more and more apparent.
However the great majority of the Courts acknowledge the general
rule. Some courts accept the rule strictly, others disregard it entirely,
while the great bulk of the cases recognize the rule but tend to shy
away from it in particular cases. No attempt can be made to formulate
any rule that will tell just what "special circumstances" will be suf-
ficient to take the case out of the operation of the general rule, but
each case will have to be decided in relation to its own peculiar facts.
Some text writers 8 have said that the modem tendency is to get
farther away from the general rule, but in view of two very recent
32 Allen v. Elder. 76 Ga. 674, 2 A. S. R. 63.
33 85 Wis. 240, 55 N. W. 708. 39 A. S. R. 838.
34, Heert v. Cruger, 14 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 508. 35 N. Y. S. 1063.
35. T Head (Tenn.) 77.
36, Corrigan v.'Tiernan, 100 Mo. 276;
2 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (4th Ed.) Par. 845;
See also: Bramhall vs. Bramhall, 216 S. W. (Mo.) 766.
37. Park v. Blodgett, 64 Conn. 28.
38. See 34 Cyc. 911.
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decisions,3 9 both giving a strict construction to the general rule, it is
impossible to agree that there is any particular well-defined tendency
of the Courts at the present time. Furthermore in all probability the
conflict and confusion that has existed in the decisions in the past will
continue in the future. HAROLD C. ACKERT, '27.
39. Brinton v. Johnson, 240 P. (Idaho, 1925) 859;
Cushenberry v. Waite-Phillips Co., 240 P. (Kan.) 400.
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